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Abstract
The paper aims at examining the hypothesis that the influence of trust on contract can be thought
of as a dynamic factor of organizational choices in supply chains. The relationship between con-
tract and trust is delineated on the basis of institutional environment, contractual incompleten-
ess, safeguards and restrictive provisions. The interaction between individual and system
elements in the formation of trust and its influence in hybrid contracting is considered. Accor-
ding to a New Institutional Economics approach and a theoretical framework is proposed. Em-
pirical evidence is provided by a case study regarding an Italian retailer company establishing
hybrid structure with its suppliers. Investments in suppliers selection provide the basis for trust
supporting relationships which economize on negotiating and litigation costs.
Keywords: hybrid structures, trust, contract
JEL: Q13, D23
1.      Introduction
The paper aims at examining the hypothesis that the influence of trust on contract can be thought
of a as dynamic factor of organizational choices in supply chains. The focus is on Agri-Food
chains: expanding on a previous analytical framework (Martino, Perugini, 2006), the study
considers the contracting basis of hybrid forms and on the centrality of trust to the existence of
hybrids structures (Hofstede, 2006). 
Trust is a very complex concept addressed under different analytical views. Many definitions
have been proposed and an enormous body of literature has progressively widen the compre-
hension of the role of trust in economic life and analysis. Research in Agri-Food sector have
provided several findings contributing to the enhancement of the comprehension of consumers’
behaviours and of innovative  way of business to business relationship (Frits, 2006; Hofstede,
2006). It is difficult, or probably impossible, to summarize into an unique, shared perspective
all the theoretical and empirical evidences. Anyway, scholars seem to interpret often trust in
terms of rules of social interaction, thus, under a transactional cost perspective the trust issue
can also be conceived in terms of the relationship between the institutional environment and the
governance structures. It has been argued that trust can be included in the area of informal cons-
traints and safeguards. This can be conceptualized in terms of the diffusion of rules from insti-
tutional environment to governance structures. This is the main view of the paper. The
knowledge about this area is really not developed (Mènard, 2000), thus the analysis proposes
several problematic steps and some conjectural outcomes. 
Mènard and Valceschini  (2005) show that the emergence hybrids characterizes the change of
Agri-Food sector. According to Mènard (2004), contracting characterizes many hybrid forms,
since the contract signed by participants is frequently a simple framework where more or less
ample room is allowed to everyone. 484   Trust and Contracting in Agri-Food Hybrid Structures
The hypothesis that influence of trust on contracts represents a dynamic factor of supply chains’
organizational choices in Agri-Food sector is examined both under a theoretical and empirical
standpoint. The paper considers only the case of business to business relationships.
Firstly, some analytical elements are proposed which suggest that the substantive relationship
between contract and trust can be delineated on the basis of institutional environment, contrac-
tual incompleteness, safeguards and restrictive provisions. Secondly, the interaction between
individual and collective elements in the formation of trust and its influence in hybrid contract-
ing is considered. Deakin et Al. (2001) have pointed out that compliance with terms of contracts
is central to trust, but also that contract adherence is tempered by flexibility beyond and outside
the contract. On the other hand, the institutional forces constraints and channel contractual be-
haviour opening options for cooperative behaviour. 
The paper is organized as follows. The argument for the role of trust in hybrid contracting is
illustrated in paragraph 2. Empirical findings are proposed in the paragraph 3. In the paragraph
4 are proposed some final remarks.
2.      Hybrid forms and Trust
2.1    The diffusion of hybrid structures in Agri-Food Sector 
Mènard and Valceschini  (2005) have pointed out the diffusion of hybrid form in Agri-food sec-
tor suggesting that their emergence can be thought of as a consequence of three main forces: the
evolution on the supply side, the evolution on demand side and the redefinition of quality con-
trol emphasizing the control both over process and products (Ménard, Valceschini, 2005, pp.
426-428). A complex public and private institutional framework support the organizational
choice in this field (Ménard, Valceschini, 2005, pp. 433-435) involving the rules intended to
support quality signals – as in the case of PDO supply and of private brand (Ryanad et al, 2005)
– as well as those set by retailers (Fulponi, 2006; Réviron and Chappuis, 2005: Mazè, 2002;
Sans et al., 2005) or requested by food safety regulation and expectations (Martino, Perugini,
2006). 
Mènard (2004) points out three fundamental regularities in hybrid structures: the tendency to-
ward aggregation of resources (pooling), the contractual basis (contracting), and the tendency
toward competition (competing). These regularities clarify to what extent hybrid forms are
rooted in both cooperation and competition, their functionality depending on whether the me-
chanisms devised are able to reconcile legal autonomy and interdependence. Namely, contrac-
ting characterizes many hybrid forms, since the contract signed by participants is frequently a
simple framework where more or less ample room is allowed to everyone. Thus a typical pro-
blem is then the need to identify the best mechanisms for optimizing alignment of transactions
to the government structure by monitoring the organization and the search for solutions to emer-
ging questions (Ménard, 2004).Gaetano Martino   485
2.2    Trust and contracting: delineating a framework for analysing organizational choices in
         Agri-Food sector
2.2.1  Conceptualizations of trust 
An interdisciplinary body of literature provides many definitions of trust which cannot be dis-
cussed here in detail1. Broadly speaking, definitions share basic elements, among them are: trust
is related to intentional behaviors, relevant in the context of economic relationships; social
norms and rules are often invoked as sources; the uncertainty about future events due to human
behaviors is also pointed out.  Some enhancements of the conceptualization of trust have been
obtained by introducing classification of types of trust (for example, see for discussion: Lyons,
Metha, 2001; Kelin Woolthuis et Al., 2005, Adler, 2001). Furthermore, McEvily et Al. (2003)
have suggested an interpretation of trust as a heuristic for how actors interpret and represent in-
formation and how they select appropriate behaviours and routines for coordinating actions
(McEvily et Al.,  2003, p. 92). Adler (2001), emphasizes the nature of trust as a mechanism of
coordinating, contributing to the comprehension of the complementarity between forms of in-
teraction and coordinating. In this context, the relationship between trust and contract appears
to be complex and, in particular, the causal nexus between trust and contract and the nature of
their relationship – whether complementary or substitute – are questioned according to contro-
versial evidence (Klein Woolthuis et Al., 2005). In general, trust seems challenges the political
economy view (Levi, 2000)2. Distrust – and even the lack of trust – raises the transaction costs
of cooperation, while  trust can play a role in reducing these transaction costs and provide a
mean for moving out of an equilibrium of non-cooperation (Levi, 2000). 
The paper aims at addressing the trust as a dynamic factor assuming that changes in the institu-
tional environment promoted by trust enhancements will influence contracting in terms of cal-
culativeness. In the New Institutional Economics the trust issue is linked to the assumption of
opportunism. This implies, in turn, that both asset specificity and contractual incompleteness
contribute to the definition of the analytical framework. 
1.  For example Gambetta (2000, p.218) states that « (…) trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of
the subjective probability with which an agent assess that another agent or group of agents will perform a
particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to
monitor it) and  in a context in which it affects his own action (…) Trust is a tentative and intrinsically fragile
response to our ignorance (…) If we were blessed with an unlimited computational ability to map out all
possible contingencies in enforceable contracts, trust would not be a problem». Under a sociological
perspective, trust emerges within the differentiation of the social systems and appears to be a basic tool
contributing to the reduction of the complexity (Luhmann, 2002, 2000)
2.  Emphasizing the role of bounded rationality, Lorenz examines the relationships between trust and cooperation. In this
context, defines trust « (…) as the judgement one makes on the basis of one’s past interactions with others that they will
seek to act in ways that favour one’s interests, rather than harm them, in circumstances that remain to be defined. Trusting
judgements inevitably remain tentative, rather certain, since they are based on a limited knowledge of others rather a
precise calculation of their interests. Correspondingly, there is nothing to preclude that trust will be transformed into
mistrust as knowledge and information are accumulated» (Lorenz, 1999, p.305). 486   Trust and Contracting in Agri-Food Hybrid Structures
2.2.2    Contractual incompleteness and contract formalization
Scholars emphasizes the relationship between trust and contractual incompleteness. According
to Brosseau and Glachant (2002, pp. 12-13), in Transaction Costs Economics the contractual
incompleteness is due to both uncertainty and institutional failures. Given that the bounded ra-
tionality of the agents and that clauses related to unverifiable variable cannot be enforced, the
contract create a “private order” allowing the parties to cooperate (Brosseau, Glachant, 2002).
On the other hands, the formalization of the contract has been considered in order to analyze the
role of trust (Chen, 2000; Lyons, Metha, 2001). Trust appears to be relevant for the interpreta-
tion of written words in the sense that, in case of trust, some interpretations accounting for ex-
pectations of opportunistic behaviours are reasonably excluded: it would be irrational to expect
these results. The distinction between formal and informal contract refers often to the use of
written words in supporting legally binding contractual terms. The “unwritten area” is relevant
to the parties because of the outcomes of not ruled possible actions. The distinction between
complete and incomplete contract refers to the fact  that a contract cannot be completely verified
by a third party in order to be enforced, even if the parties can observe all elements of the con-
tract itself. Whether a third party is entitled to verify an unwritten term depends upon the law:
for example, in some case, the contractual law may allow the judge to implement an agreement.
In this case, a judge may look for verifying elements left in the “unwritten area”. The parties
could be costly engaged in reducing this area, expanding the set of formal contractual terms.
Trust may expands the area between the “unwritten” and “written words”, introducing unwrit-
ten trusted elements and allowing the parties to save costs of negotiating (figure 1). The litera-
ture about trust in business to business relationship, for example, suggests that a party may
allocate, at least, partially, her/his decision rights to the trustworthy trading partner. Whether or
not the emerging “trust area” will reduce the degree of incompleteness it is a different story: it
depends upon the fact that this  “area”  may (or may not) concern verifiable variables. Unwritten
verifiable variables do not increase the degree of incompleteness of the contract, but could force
the parties to a costly ex post negotiation. Unverifiable variables, written and unwritten, deter-
mines contractual incompleteness. Trusting a partner about unwritten, unverifiable variable
does not reduce the degree of incompleteness of the contract. Rather it would facilitate the re-
lationship, incompleteness becoming to some degree less effective.
Figure 1. A hypothetical relation between trust and contractual formalization
Written area 
Possibile 
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2.2.3  Trust as a weak hybrid form
In the analysis of hybrids trust is firstly conceptualized a weak form of governance. According
to Mènard: « (…) private governments admit more or less formal embedded entities, possessing
various amounts  of power. At one end of spectrum, the closest to market arrangements, are hy-
brid forms relying primarily on trust. In these hybrids, decisions are decentralized, and loose
coordination is implemented through mutual influence and reciprocity. From a calculative per-
spective, trust can maintain cohesion and guarantee some coordination because it is rooted in
the need to maintain continuity in the relationship. We are not talking about a purely  informal
relationship here. Trust can operate a (weak) form of government because it is based on specific
arrangements and performed by specific actors» (Mènard, 2004, p. 367, italics added). Under
this view, trust is conceived as less a centralized hybrid structure.
But Transaction Costs Economics also considers trust under a more general view. Levi have
pointed out that Williamson (1993) is right in criticizing the broad use of the term trust. The as-
sumption of opportunism is central to the transaction cost economics, thus distrust or absence
of trust represent the baseline of behaviour (Levi, 2000, p. 140)1. Under this hypothesis and dra-
wing from a restricted body of literature, some elements can be delineated which suggest that:
a) trust influences the contracting in hybrids; b) trust may act as a factor affecting the dynamic





These elements are illustrated in the following subsection. 
2.2.4  Trust and contract 
Trust and institutional environment Transaction Costs Economics states that institutional en-
vironment influences the choice of governance structures. Mènard (2000) argues that there is a
lack of analytical knowledge about how rules diffuse from this environment to governance
structure. How institutional trust may affect a governance structure is thus primarily an analy-
tical problem. As the institutional environment is characterized by some class of trust, the
choices of governance form will differ with respect to the case of an environment characterized
by distrust or absence of trust. This is a consequence of an exogenous influence (Williamson,
1993). On the other hand, agents are interested to increase the degree of flexibility of organiza-
tional arrangements, namely in order to deal with exogenous shocks (Williamson, 1996). Thus
changes in the terms of economic calculation  and the demand for flexibility may affect the con-
tracting basis of  hybrids. On the other hand, mechanisms for coordinating transactions, orga-
nizing transactions and solving disputes find their legitimacy and support in the institutional
environment. These mechanisms  may be influenced by trust (Furubotn, Richter, 2001; Akerlof,
1970), thus institutional trust influence contracting. 
1.  Thus the analysis may elucidate when distrust is both the most rational and useful reaction and when trust or
its functional alternative would be useful. Finally Levi states that: a) distrust raises the transaction costs of
cooperation; b) trust can contribute to reduce these transaction costs and provide a means for moving out of an
equilibrium of non-cooperation; c) trust is not always the solution to problems created by the absence of trust
and distrust; d) both absence of trust and distrust may spur the creation of institution that facilitate gains from
trade, although raising transaction costs (Levi, 2000, p. 151).488   Trust and Contracting in Agri-Food Hybrid Structures
Trust and contractual incompleteness  It has been argued that where there is trust the terms of
contract can be relatively incomplete and any bargaining less formalized than where there is
distrust (Levi, 2000, pp. 142-143).  This is a consequence of the attenuation of probability of
opportunistic behaviour. It implies that trust can directly influence the choice of the contract
terms. To some extent thus trust facilitates the adherence to contracts obligations: in other
words trust can be thought of as a tool for reducing the “unwritten words area” (see section
2.2.2)
Trust and safeguards In contracting approach, the typical content of hybrids derives from the
combination of ways of coordinating partners. These mechanisms are (Mènards, 2004, pp. 361-
363): a) decision regarding the number of participants to the agreement; b) duration; c) specifi-
cation requirements; d) adaptation clauses; e) complementary safeguards. Safeguards can be
formal or informal: « (…) this is where the issue of trust enters into the picture. Several authors
see trust as a way to secure transaction when the contract are incomplete (…) Trust would alle-
viate opportunism and would be made operational through recurrent transaction (…) In that re-
spect, it can be argued that trust is a form of calculativeness, (…) although it has been
challenged» (Ménard, 2004, p. 364).
Trust can affect the nature of informal safeguards (Furubotn, Richter, 2001) and thus alleviate
opportunism.
Trust and restrictive provisions Hybrids require continuity, specific mechanism have to be
created for coordinating activities, organizing transaction and solving disputes. Among these
restrictive provisions delineate the domain of action of partners, limiting their autonomy and
identifying areas in which collective decisions must prevail (Mènard, 2004, p. 365). To what
extent they make individual and collective decisions compatible may depend upon how an in-
dividual relies on her/his partners. Limiting her/his individual autonomy a party  connects it in-
terest to the allocation of decision rights to the other party. This is related to the economic
calculation but it also implies that the party allowed  will operate according to the understan-
ding of the agreement. To some extent, this may imply trust as a belief that inform on how to act
(Levi, 2000, p. 139). 
2.2.5  System and individual level
It has been argued that the complex nature of business relationships implies both elements of
immediate self-interest and of mutuality and reciprocity the expected benefits from which are
enhanced by trust Deakin et al. (2001, p.110). The mix of competition and co-operation charac-
terizing hybrids thus implies a relationships between self-interest and mutuality and reciprocity.
Co-operating parties adopt a distinctive attitude of flexibility with regard to contractual perfor-
mance which in turn implies a relationship between contract adherence and flexibility (Deakin
et al. 2001, 130). According to Williamson (1991), flexibility is a relevant factor contributing
to the emergence of hybrid structures in Agri-Food sector (Martino, Perugini, 2006). Contract
adherence and demand for flexibility characterizes the dimension of the relationship which is
relevant for individual agents (individual level).
On the other hand, the contractual environment constraints but also channels the contractual be-
haviour opening options for cooperative behaviour (Deakin et al., 2001, p. 133). Thus at system
level the contracting framework established by hybrid take into consideration the flexibility
beyond the contract (being ready to exchange business information; honouring informal under-
standings; and being ready to renegotiate the terms of contract at any time, Deakin et al., 2001,
p. 129) and the flexibility outside contract (being ready to help in an emergency, being preparedGaetano Martino   489
to give and take, and being willing to overlook occasional faults, Deakin et al., 2001, p. 129).
The more effective are the institutional forces in increasing information flows, and reducing the
element of conflict, monitoring and risk, the greater will be the potential within individual rela-
tionships for trust-building (Deakin et al., 2001, p. 110). At system level hybrid organizations
thus may enhance the trust level of individual relationships influencing the information flows
and promoting conflicts resolution. The analytical elements identified and described above can
be allocated in the conceptual “space” defined by the individual and system dimensions (Figure
2). The resulting framework aims at illustrating the change promoted by trust in hybrid contrac-
ting basis. Given the contractual framework, contract adherence essentially concerns the indi-
vidual parties. Interpreting the written words and modifying restriction provisions contribute to
establish the threshold between the contractual contents and the “beyond and outside area”. Si-
milarly the modification of restricted provisions may affect the emerging demand for flexibility
which in turn tends to influence the definition of contractual framework. The dot line indicate
the relationship between the micro level and the institutional environment. North (1990) explai-
ned the processes supporting the interaction between organization and institutions: the influence
of institutional trust on the level of governance choices can be conceptualized according to this
analytical basis.
Figure 2. Institutional environment and Hybrid’s contractual framework
The analysis proposed suggests that at a given level of asset specificity the diffusion of trust-
oriented beliefs and behaviours may favour the emergence of trust type hybrids: in the figure 3,
this is represented by the step n.1. An intensification of formalization of rules and conventions
changes the nature of hybrid from trust to relational networks (Ménard, 2004): as the asset spe-
cificity increases, the form of governance tends to a more intensive centralization. This trends













- Interpreting written words 
- Modifying restrictive provisions Modifying restrictive provisions 
- Implementing informal safeguards
- Legitimating and supporting mechanism
   for continuity 
- Changing the terms of calculativeness490   Trust and Contracting in Agri-Food Hybrid Structures
further change toward Leaderships forms, which is a consequence of the emerging of authority
established by a firm over the remaining partners. The range of assets specificity compatible
with relational networks may be increased, whether trust-based rules really became able to at-
tenuate
Figure 3. Trust and changes in the choices of hybrid structures 
3.      Empirical findings: the Case Study  Grandi Magazzini Fioroni (GMF)
Some empirical evidences are proposed in order to corroborate the theoretical framework deli-
neated. The demand for flexibility can be studied by considering change promoted by the qua-
lity signals (Raynaud et al., 2005), the relationship between agents along supply chain (Fearne,
1998) and the evolution stimulated by consumers’ preferences (Fearne et al., 2001).  Secondly,
a case study research conducted in a previous research step (Martino, Perugini, 2006) and con-
cerning Coop Italia, an Italian large company operating in the distribution stage, proposes some
interesting elements concerning the demand for flexibility and the related change in the organi-
zation of its supply chains. The quest for enhancements in safety and quality of brand products
has implied the emergence of a hybrid organization (Martino, Perugini, 2006). Some degrees of
freedom for the suppliers have been then introduced in order to mobilize their competences in
solving problems eventually emerging: trust has to be considered the factor promoting the chan-
ge of the hybrid organization. Namely, in many supply chains managed by Coop the degree of
asset specificity has implied more centralized form of governance, based on buyer’s authority.
Nonetheless, a comparable degree of asset specificity appear to compatible with a more decen-
tralized form, allowing the suppliers to operate with more degree of freedom. This is a direct
consequence of experienced relationships and consequent trust (see: Martino, Perugini, 2006,
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Evidences from the GMF case study are then proposed in order to examine the relationship bet-
ween the contract and the trust in the case of less complex hybrid structure.
3.2    The GMF Case Study
From the methodological point of view, according to the usual approach in agri-food sector
(Sterns et al., 1998), a set of research questions has been preliminarily specified. The literature
about trust provides a large amount of theoretical issues and interpretations of empirical fin-
dings: they provide the basis for research questions of this paper. The main questions here con-
cern: a) the main role and the content of contracts adopted by Agri-food companies, involved in
hybrid arrangement; b) the perceived role of trust within the contracting approach. The genera-
lization method is the analytical generalization in which a previous developed theory is used as
a template for comparing the empirical evidence from case study (Yin, 1994, p.31) and in which
results are generalized to theory.
Theoretical propositions have been then composed and structured in order to define a
prediction pattern. As regards this paper, the basic theory from which the predicted pattern of
nonequivalent variables (Yin, 1994) is derived, is the framework of TCE and of the economics
of hybrid forms (Mènard, 2004). The theory predicts that contracting framework provide by a
hybrid organization stimulate contractual adherence which, in turn, may require some degree
of flexibility. Thus the trust-based rules of interaction among agents, derived from institutional
environment, may imply change in the contracting framework. Therefore the predicted pattern
includes: a) general characteristics of hybrid forms chosen; b) nexus between contract and
flexibility; c) role of the institutional environment. The matching between the predicted and
the empirical patterns would provide a control of the theory proposed. 
Given the limited knowledge of the process of diffusion of rules from institutional
environment to governance strcutres (Ménard, 2000), the economics of hybrid form (Mènard,
2004) provides the analytical framework to link empirical data to theoretical propositions.
Criteria for interpreting the findings are derived from the usual business study approach and
from the general proposition emphasizing the interaction between individual and system level
(Deakin et al., 2001).
The case study design includes a single unit of analysis and aims at examining the relations alo-
ng the supply chains as they are shaped by the GMF strategies. The case study has been carried
out through different activities of data collection. The sources of the data used are: a) docu-
ments: internal reports, administrative documents and newspaper articles; b) interviews: focu-
sed repeated interviews. In order to enhance the information validity, data triangulation among
different sources has been performed.
The following sections briefly summarizes  the interviews reports and the other collected da-
ta.The GMF is a 50 years old company involved in several distribution activity in Central Italy.  
It employs 900 workers and clerks and manages 230 units involving 100.000 m2 (two Distribu-
tion Centers;  eight Cash and Carry; 9 Ipermarkets; 29 supermarkets and several discount cen-
ters). The company is involved both in food and no-food distribution activities. The distinctive
organization of the supply chain is illustrated in Figure 4. The GMF design general contract with
large food companies (national level) settling a network relationships with these supplier. The
centralization of this contracting stage allow the GMS (and the other firms forming the “central
buyer company”) to economize about the contracting costs. The need for flexibility – both for
supplier (specific marketing policies) and for the GMF (specific consumers’ requests) – induces492   Trust and Contracting in Agri-Food Hybrid Structures
the trading parties to admit a second level of contracting (local level) which has to be compatible
with the national level.
Figure 4. The contractual networks of GMF
The role of institutional environment is strictly due to the Italian contract law, while a structured
contractual environment emerges and influences the relationships along supply chains. With re-
spect to the single transaction between th GMF and a supplier the framework provided at natio-
nal level allows a degree of flexibility which may managed by transactors. This defines the
boundaries of the area which may be interpreted as “beyond and outside the contract”. The re-
lationship between trust and contract emerging in the case study is illustrated in the figure 5.
The experience of the managerial staff of GMF is central to the development of the economic
relationships among the GMF and the supplier. The use of the distinctive knowledge and expe-
rience of the company represents a feature of the entrepreneurial model adopted. Having selec-
ted a supplier, e.g. a local supplier, according to the quality strategy, the contractual relationship
is firstly a consequence of investment in searching and selecting potential suppliers. Secondly,
the company prefers simple written contract and has not never had the necessity of solving a
commercial conflict by legal judgements. The low number of contractual terms (price, quantity,
basic qualitatitve characteristics) reflects the recirpocal trust of the parties, established by a long
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term relationship. Trust is also at the basis of the possibility of solving potential conflicts wit-
hout any legal judgement. Here becomes also clear the ability of parties of intepreting trust in
the sense of economic calculativeness: the long term relationship allow them to look for coope-
rative solution to potential conflit, avoinding the costs of legal judgements. Since the company
verifies the behaviours of each supplier, but also allocate to the supplier some decision rights –
given the little “written area” – then the type of trust at stake could be defined as a “conditional
trust”.
Figure 5: Experience, Collaboration and Trust in GMF
This case shows that contract adherence and the “beyond and outside” area are linked (see
previous section), with the interpretation of written words and the definition of restrictive
provision influencing this link. A critical point is provided by the evidence about the joint
management of market crisis. Depending to extent of these crisis, the parties vary their
behaviors. When the demand for a given product decreases, the GMF is allowed, beyond the
contract, to manage the market at his best, while some critical contractual terms could be also
jointly revised or differently managed by the parties. This is the crucial case of the price fixed
by contract, which may be revised (i.e. decreased) due to market crisis, as both the GMF and
the supplier prefer to share the economic losses in order to maintain the market link. A
temporary loss is thus preferred to a the loss of a market share: this reflects the abilities of the
parties to make reciprocal trust as an element of economic utility. 
4.      Final remarks
Hybrids forms are increasingly diffuses in Agri-Food supply chains, thus their contracting basis
can be investigated under different views. The paper has taken into consideration the relati-
onship between trust and contract. The analysis suggests that trust can be thought of as dynamic
factor in the organization choice, namely in the interaction between the hybrid and the institu-
tional level. A preliminary empirical evidence seems provide some elements in order to corro-
borate the theoretical views proposed. 
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The research strategy needed to enhance the outcomes has to include: a) a more detailed inquiry
about the theoretical elements: the role of analytical elements mentioned should be, for examp-
le, better discussed; b) the empirical set of data has to be enlarged, in particular relying on the
opportunities provided by case study research.
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